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POLARIZATION AT THE SUPREME COURT? 
SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS THROUGH THE 
PRISM OF LEGAL THEORY 
 
MIRIAM GALSTON* 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Much has been written about Obergefell v. Hodges, holding that 
same-sex marriage is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.  Virtually 
all commentators view the decision as an example of an increasingly 
polarized Supreme Court.   
This article challenges that characterization by analyzing Kennedy’s 
majority opinion and Roberts’ dissent in Obergefell in light of the legal 
theories of H. L. A. Hart and Lon Fuller.  The article argues that, from a 
legal theory perspective, Kennedy and Roberts exhibit numerous, often 
surprising commonalities.  In addition, Kennedy’s arguments seem to 
accurately reflect the methodology he explicitly endorses.  Roberts, in 
contrast, seems to exaggerate his originalist commitment to the 
Constitution because he relies on public policy assumptions that he fails to 
recognize or defend.  I conclude that Kennedy’s substantive due process 
approach is constrained by explicit Court precedents, rather than being 
open-ended or idiosyncratic, and that Roberts relies in key respects upon 
public policy, which is obscured by his claim of originalism and his focus 
on the separation of powers.   
The legal theory analysis thus reveals a more penetrating, yet more 
moderating, theoretical framework within which to discuss disagreements 
about individual rights, especially evolving claims to previously 
unrecognized rights, than is possible based upon constitutional theory 
alone. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Much has been written about the landmark decision Obergefell v. 
Hodges, in which the Supreme Court held that same-sex couples have a 
right to marry protected by the Fourteenth Amendment of the 
Constitution.1 These characterizations depict Justice Kennedy and Chief 
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Ph.D. University of Chicago.  My deep gratitude goes to friends and colleagues who have so helpfully 
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Justice Roberts as polar opposites. Chief Justice Roberts and the other 
dissenters2 say they evaluate the issues from an originalist, textualist, or 
traditionalist constitutional perspective.3 Critics of Justice Kennedy’s 
reasoning see him as enlarging the scope of substantive due process based 
upon personal preferences or public policy,4 while supporters characterize 
the majority opinion as grounded in the common law, living 
constitutionalism, or deliberate democracy.5 
The present essay, which analyzes Kennedy’s and Robert’s opinions 
in light of the legal theories of H. L. A. Hart and Lon Fuller, undermines 
these characterizations in two ways. First, although the contrast between 
the constitutional theories of Roberts and Kennedy appears at first to 
mirror the famous debate about the concept of law between Hart and 
Fuller, a deeper examination of the legal theorists’ writings reveals that the 
two Justices depart in significant ways from the theorists they resemble. 
As a consequence, the comparison ultimately narrows the theoretical 
divide between the Justices.6 
The result, however, is not symmetrical. Through the prism of legal 
theory, Kennedy’s arguments seem to accurately reflect the methodology 
he explicitly endorses. Roberts, in contrast, seems to exaggerate his 
originalist commitment to the Constitution because he relies on public 
policy assumptions that he fails to recognize or defend. 
In addition, the jurisprudential analysis underscores that Kennedy and 
Roberts share a fundamental kinship in their fidelity to the constitutional 
design of the American legal system because both Justices adopt a view of 
judicial decision-making that rests on sources internal to the Constitution’s 
                                                                                                                           
and other shortcomings are solely mine.  
 1. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
 2. Usually I refer to “the dissent” or “Roberts.” Justices Scalia and Thomas joined the Chief 
Justice’s dissent. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2611. Justice Scalia also dissented separately (which Justice 
Thomas joined); Justice Thomas wrote a separate dissent (which Justice Scalia joined); and Justice 
Alito dissented (which Justices Scalia and Thomas joined). Id.  
 3. See D.M. DORSEN, THE UNEXPECTED SCALIA: A CONSERVATIVE JUSTICE'S LIBERAL 
OPINIONS 45 (2017); William N. Eskridge, Jr., The Marriage Equality Cases and Constitutional 
Theory, 2015 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 111, 118 (2015). 
 4. This is the position of the dissenters, among others. See infra note 60 and accompanying 
text. 
 5. See Kenji Yoshino, A New Birth of Freedom?: Obergefell v. Hodges, 129 HARV. L. REV. 
147, 164, 174–75 (2015) [hereinafter Yoshino, A New Birth]; Glen Staszewski, Obergefell and 
Democracy, 97 B.U. L. REV. 31, 32–34, 39–41 (2017). Some commentators, however, see Justice 
Kennedy’s opinion as a type of originalism. See William Baude, Is Originalism Our Law?, 115 
COLUM. L. REV. 2349, 2382 (2015); Ian P. Farrell, Enlightened Originalism, 54 HOUS. L. REV. 569, 
620, 623–30 (2017). 
 6.    See infra Part IV. Although the present analysis maps Kennedy’s and Roberts’ opinions in 
Obergefell onto the theories of Fuller and Hart, I do not claim that either Justice deliberately adheres to 
a specific legal theory in this decision or that each Justice is consistent in his decisions more generally. 
Were the Justices to deliberately situate their constitutional decisions within a legal theory framework, 
their decisions would likely be more consistent from a theoretical perspective as a result. At present, 
Justice Thomas is probably the Justice who comes closest to following this approach. 
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basic framework, rather than injecting external sources of law into their 
interpretations, as Kennedy is frequently alleged to have done. The legal 
theory analysis reveals a more penetrating, yet more moderating 
framework within which to discuss disagreements about individual rights, 
especially evolving claims to previously unrecognized rights, than is 
possible based upon constitutional theory alone. 
These distinctions matter, in practice as well as in theory. There is a 
tendency to emphasize the degree to which the Supreme Court is 
polarized, paralleling the political polarizations in the country as a whole. 
This tendency, which focuses on the polarity of outcomes in many 
constitutional cases, is accurate as far as it goes. The present analysis, in 
contrast, focuses on the logical structure and theoretical aspects of the 
Justices’ arguments rather than the substantive outcomes. It recognizes the 
commonalities of the protagonists and provides a broader context often 
lacking in contemporary debates about polarization on the Supreme Court, 
and it suggests that the tendency of each side to dismiss the reasoning of 
the other as illegitimate is itself illegitimate. Relatedly, by revealing the 
public policy dimensions of Roberts’ approach, this analysis calls into 
question the moral high ground that some of the dissenters claim when 
they accuse Kennedy of lacking fidelity to the law. 
 Part I sets forth the constitutional dimensions of the contrast between 
Kennedy and Roberts in Obergefell. It describes the differences in their 
positions and reasoning that have led to the Justices’ opinions being 
considered diametrically opposed. This Part concludes that the Justices’ 
disagreements about constitutional theory reflect a deeper disagreement 
about the concept of law, which is a theme of legal theory. Constitutional 
theory typically takes the founding documents of a specific nation as the 
starting point of analysis. Legal theory, in contrast, understands legal 
systems and constitutional structures in general, that is, it works from a 
perspective external to and independent of any specific legal system, 
although to some extent informed by knowledge of the laws of specific 
nations. A legal theory framework can situate judicial decisions such as 
Obergefell in a more comprehensive framework than does constitutional 
theory.  
Part II describes the legal theory of H. L. A. Hart, who shares Roberts’ 
insistence on the importance of protecting the integrity of law’s core 
meanings by denying a role for judicial discretion when analyzing clear or 
standard instances of a legal text. Although Roberts does not refer either to 
Hart or the positivist tradition that he exemplifies, this Part discusses the 
striking similarities between aspects of Hart’s legal theory and Roberts’ 
constitutional argument in Obergefell. Both Hart and Roberts emphasize 
that law must have a fixed core meaning to preserve its integrity and 
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maintain the distinction between the rule of law and the rule of men.   
Part III explores Fuller’s purposive theory of law and compares it to 
the reasoning of Kennedy’s majority opinion, which largely reflects 
Fuller’s concept of law. In rejecting Hart’s theory of core meanings, Fuller 
argues that adjudicating even core or standard instances of legal texts 
depends upon understanding their purpose, not just the semantic features 
or everyday meanings of the texts’ terms. The heart of Kennedy’s due 
process argument in Obergefell illustrates this aspect of Fuller’s theory, 
since it relies on the purposes and rationales set forth by the Supreme 
Court in the decisions that developed the view that marriage is a 
fundamental right protected by the liberty prong of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  
Part IV qualifies the observations elaborated in Parts II and III in 
significant respects. Based on an analysis of Hart’s legal theory, I argue 
that Roberts in fact exercises a significant amount of judicial discretion in 
his dissent and that, in so doing, he relies on public policy rather than 
constitutional norms. This narrows the divide separating Roberts and 
Kennedy. Further, I argue that Kennedy’s reasoning in Obergefell 
represents a form of purposivism restrained by the methodology and 
doctrines of prior Supreme Court cases rather than a reliance on the 
secular natural law theory often attributed to Fuller. This fact further 
undermines the sharpness of the contrast usually drawn between the two 
Justices. 
Part V develops the evidence in support of Kennedy’s restrained 
purposivism by elaborating the pivotal distinction between political or 
judicial discourse that relies on sources external to a particular nation’s 
legal framework and discourse that develops a nation’s legal system 
through sources internal to its constitutional design. Chief Justice Roberts’ 
reasoning in Obergefell is a clear example of the internal approach, as are 
originalist decisions in general. But Kennedy’s reasoning in Obergefell 
also conforms—albeit less obviously—to the internal sources approach in 
that it resolves the issue of same-sex marriage not only in a way that is 
faithful to the foundational principles of the Constitution, but also to the 
doctrines and practices of previous Supreme Courts confronting contested 
rights claims. Despite the disagreements between Roberts and Kennedy as 
a matter of constitutional law, then, from a broader legal theory 
perspective, both Justices exemplify an internal sources approach. Their 
dueling decisions in Obergefell remain squarely within, and faithful to, the 
original constitutional design. 
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I. CONSTITUTIONAL DIMENSIONS 
In Obergefell, both Kennedy and three of the dissenters agree that 
marriage is one of the personal and intimate choices that the concept of 
liberty in the Fourteenth Amendment embraces and the Amendment’s due 
process clause protects. Of course, neither the Constitution nor the 
Fourteenth Amendment mentions marriage. The Supreme Court referred 
in dictum to marriage as a fundamental right encompassed within the 
liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment as early as 1923,7 yet in 
1955 it declined to overturn a Virginia Supreme Court opinion upholding 
the state’s miscegenation law.8 It was not until 1967, in Loving v. Virginia, 
that the United States Supreme Court held that marriage is a fundamental 
right protected by the Fourteenth Amendment and that preserving racial 
purity is not an acceptable state interest that justifies restrictions on that 
right.9 The Loving decision rested primarily on equal protection grounds; 
however, the last page of the opinion also declared that the Fourteenth 
Amendment due process clause protects marriage as “one of the basic civil 
rights of man” and “a vital personal right essential to the orderly pursuit of 
happiness by free men.”10 This proposition is now uncontested in 
American constitutional doctrine.  
Since the majority opinion and the three dissents in Obergefell agree 
that marriage is a protected fundamental right,11 the only contested issue 
was whether that right includes the right to marry a member of one’s own 
sex. 
Justice Kennedy begins from the premise that the judiciary’s 
obligation to interpret the Constitution requires it first to identify and 
                                                      
 7. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (invalidating a state law prohibiting private and 
public schools from teaching a modern language other than English to students that had not passed the 
eighth grade because the law denied fundamental rights implicit in the liberty protected by the 
Fourteenth Amendment, namely, the parents’ right to educate their children and teachers’ right to 
pursue the profession of teaching). The Court also referred in dictum to the right to marry in Skinner v. 
Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (invalidating, on Equal Protection grounds, a state sterilization 
law because it denied the fundamental right to procreate). 
 8. See Naim v. Naim, 350 U.S. 891 (1955) (vacating and remanding Virginia decision 
upholding state’s anti-miscegenation law); Naim v. Naim, 90 S.E.2d 849 (Va. 1956) (affirming earlier 
decision); Naim v. Naim 350 U.S. 985 (1956) (stating that a federal question was not properly before 
it). See also Richard Delgado, Naim v. Naim, 12 NEVADA L.J. 525 (2012) (arguing, against 
justifications of the Court’s ruling as prudential, that the decision was wrong at the time). 
 9. 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
 10. Id. at 12. The opinion fails to note that the phrase beginning “essential . . .” is a quotation 
from Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399.  
 11. Justice Thomas does not endorse a theory of substantive due process.  See infra note 29. 
Throughout this article, “fundamental rights” refers to rights protected by the due process clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, which include the rights in the Bill of Rights that have been incorporated into 
the Fourteenth Amendment and other rights deemed fundamental. Courts and commentators disagree 
as to the meaning of the phrase. See MILTON R. KONVITZ, FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS: HISTORY OF A 
CONSTITUTIONAL DOCTRINE (2001).  
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protect the fundamental rights encompassed in the meaning of the liberty 
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause.12 The 
heart of Kennedy’s analysis is that this concept of liberty is not fixed; 
rather it has acquired new meanings throughout the nation’s history.13 
Thus, when the Court interprets the meaning of the fundamental right to 
marriage, it must take into account “new insights” into the “nature of 
injustice” that have developed in recent decades.14 Therefore, in addition 
to the rights specified in the Bill of Rights, the protected rights “extend to 
certain personal choices central to individual dignity and autonomy, 
including intimate choices that define personal identity and beliefs.”15 
These are the rights that “allow persons, within a lawful realm, to define 
and express their identity.”16  
While conceding that marriage had always been understood as a 
relationship between a man and a woman, Kennedy argues that this 
limitation is not inherent in the idea of marriage.17 First, he establishes that 
the meaning of marriage has undergone transformation in profound ways 
throughout history by recounting several legal and social changes that 
have occurred in the previous centuries. For example, arranged marriages 
have given way to voluntary ones, and women no longer lose property 
rights upon marrying (coverture).18 Kennedy attributes these changes to 
changing social attitudes, especially as regards the status and “dignity” of 
women.19 He then outlines a series of other developments—medical, 
social, and legal—that support the position that attitudes toward same-sex 
relationships have so evolved in recent decades as to favor understanding 
the dignity and associated rights sought by same-sex individuals as within 
the purview of the constitutionally protected freedom to marry.20 
  
                                                      
 12. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2597–98 (2015). Toward the end of the opinion, 
Kennedy also argues that same-sex marriage is protected under the Fourteenth Amendment’s equal 
protection clause. Id. at 2604–05. This aspect of the opinion has been criticized, even by those who do 
not criticize the due process analysis. In contrast, Peter Nicolas analyzes the case in a way that 
emphasizes the importance of the equal protection rationale. Peter Nicolas, Fundamental Rights in a 
Post-Obergefell World, 27 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 331, 343–52 (2016) (arguing that the due process 
clause protects primarily negative liberty rights, while the equal protection clause protects primarily 
affirmative liberty rights). 
 13. See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2598. 
 14. Id. at 2596, 2598. 
 15. Id. at 2597; see infra notes 99–105 and accompanying text. 
 16. Id. at 2593. 
 17. See id. at 2594. 
 18. See id. at 2595. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2596–97. 
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Although these reflections buttress the proposition that there have 
been significant changes in attitudes toward the nature of the marital 
relationship in general, as well as attitudes toward the status of 
homosexuals, they do not in themselves compel the view that same-sex 
marriage should be considered the type of fundamental right that is 
guaranteed by the substantive due process clause. Nor does Kennedy 
presume that they do. Rather than resting the majority’s constitutional 
holding exclusively on these changing social attitudes and legal 
developments, Kennedy seeks to establish it by analyzing the principles or 
reasons why marriage has been treated as a fundamental right in the first 
place for so long and by so many. While he accepts that “[h]istory and 
tradition guide and discipline this inquiry,” Kennedy also asserts that they 
“do not set its outer boundaries.”21 Kennedy’s method thus “respects our 
history and learns from it without allowing the past alone to rule the 
present.”22 At the same time, although he rejects the dispositive character 
of social and cultural history and tradition, Kennedy limits his expansion 
to views anchored in the Court’s own precedents and pronouncements.  
Chief Justice Roberts’ dissent presents the issue in the first instance as 
one of the separation of powers and the role of the judiciary.23 He 
emphasizes that the majority’s decision may be correct as a matter of 
public policy, but public policy is the province of legislatures, not courts, 
because the latter are limited to interpreting, rather than creating, law.24 
Even if the legislatures of some states enact unwise policies into law, it is 
for the people, adhering to democratic practices, to right such wrongs.25 If 
a court disregards this fact, it will erode the rule of law and substitute the 
rule of men in its stead.26 For Roberts, then, the integrity of the 
Constitution and democracy in the United States depend upon the 
judiciary observing and safeguarding the boundary between the two 
branches. 
Although Roberts argues that the issue dividing him and the majority 
is the role of the judiciary, not the merits or desirability of same-sex 
marriage, the bulk of his dissent implicitly concedes that the merits of the 
majority’s position regarding same-sex marriage is paramount. This is 
because, as Roberts knows, the judiciary’s proper role is derivative of the 
                                                      
 21. Id. at 2598. 
 22. Id.; see County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 857 (1998) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring) (stating that, in substantive due process decisions, “history and tradition are the starting 
point, but not necessarily the ending point” of the inquiry). 
 23. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2611–12, 2616, 2624–25; see also id. at 2629 (Scalia, J. 
dissenting); id. at 2631–32 (Thomas, J., dissenting); id. at 2642 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 24. Id. at 2611.   
 25. Id. at 2612.  
 26. Id. at 2611.  
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constitutional status of the marriage right at issue. If that right is a 
fundamental right, then the Constitution requires the Court to ascertain 
whether that right has been accorded due process of law, i.e., whether the 
government has a compelling interest in infringing it. Fundamental rights 
warrant constitutional protection regardless of what majorities or 
legislatures prefer and do not depend on democratic processes for their 
protection.27 Therefore, although Roberts states that his disagreement with 
the majority is merely structural, it actually depends, as a matter of logic, 
on the portions of the lengthy dissent that follow in which Roberts defends 
the proposition that the fundamental right of marriage is limited to 
opposite-sex marriage.28 If he is correct about the meaning of the marriage 
right, and accepting his position about the Court’s role, extending the right 
to marry to same-sex couples would be a matter of personal preference or 
public policy, which should be decided by legislatures. If the majority is 
correct that same-sex marriage is encompassed in the fundamental right of 
marriage, then the role of the judiciary is to determine if the denial of that 
right can be justified by a state’s compelling interests. 
Roberts’ and the other dissenters’ objections to considering same-sex 
unions fundamental under the substantive due process standard29 derives 
in large part from their view that the plaintiffs are claiming constitutional 
protection for the right to same-sex marriage, rather than the right to 
marriage simply.30 Their view is based on doctrines elaborated in a series 
of cases that   seek to circumscribe the situations in which a court can 
discover a “new” fundamental right. According to one of the most cited of 
such cases, Washington v. Glucksberg, to warrant due process protection, 
fundamental rights must have two characteristics. First, they must be 
limited to those values that are “objectively, deeply rooted in this Nation’s 
history and tradition”31 and “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty . . . 
such that neither justice nor liberty would exist if they were sacrificed.”32 
                                                      
 27. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997); Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2605–
06 (majority opinion); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 496–97 (1965) (Goldberg, J., 
concurring) (rejecting Stewart’s position that the state’s contraception ban, though “uncommonly 
silly,” was a matter of social policy for the legislature to decide and arguing instead that the question 
was for the Court to decide because marital privacy is a fundamental personal right). 
 28. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2616–21 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 29. All the Justices except Thomas accept some version of substantive due process. Thomas 
would confine the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause to procedural due process, and he 
argues that the only freedom protected by the liberty provisions of the due process clause is freedom 
from physical restraint and government intrusion. See id. at 2632–35.  
 30. See id. at 2614–15, 2619–20 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (stating the core meaning of 
marriage, i.e., marriage as traditionally defined, is the right protected by the due process clause and 
Supreme Court precedents); id. at 2628 (Scalia, J., dissenting); id. at 2640 (Alito, J., dissenting).  
 31. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720–21 (quoting Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 502 
(1977) (plurality opinion)).  
 32. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721 (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325–26 (1937)). 
See also Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 593 n.3 
(2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (asserting that the two quoted formulations constitute two different 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol11/iss2/6
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While the right to marry can be seen as qualifying from the perspective of 
history and tradition, according to Roberts, the right to same-sex marriage 
cannot. 
Second, to qualify for protected fundamental status, a right must have 
“a careful description.”33 Although the meaning of this expression is 
unclear,34 the requirement is intended to constrain judges in the way they 
formulate new fundamental rights. In 1989, in Michael H. v. Gerald D., 
Justice Scalia stated this specificity requirement narrowly as requiring a 
court to find “the most specific level at which a relevant tradition 
protecting, or denying protection to, the asserted right can be identified.”35 
In Michael H., a biological father claimed that the state was denying his 
rights as a parent, at a time when parental rights had already been 
recognized as fundamental for Fourteenth Amendment purposes by the 
Court.36 Scalia reframed the parent’s claim as the alleged fundamental 
right of a biological father of a child born during an adulterous 
relationship with a married woman to prove paternity or be allowed 
visitation. Then, relying upon his asserted “most specific level” 
methodology, Scalia rejected the parent’s claim because there was no 
established historical tradition for a right thus described.37 Although three 
other Justices joined Scalia’s plurality opinion, two of them wrote a 
concurrence to reject his “most specific right” methodology because it 
demanded more specificity than the Court’s precedents required and it 
could prove excessively narrow in particular situations.38 Subsequent 
substantive due process decisions have avoided using Scalia’s “most 
specific right” language. Several have framed the right seeking 
constitutional protection in quite specific terms,39 while others have not. 
Scalia, however, continued to employ his version of the second 
                                                                                                                           
standards). Cf. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 909 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
(disputing the “deeply rooted” requirement and pointing out that the right to interracial marriage in 
Loving was not deeply rooted in the American tradition).  
 33. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721.  
 34. See Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993) (originating the phrase). At a minimum, it 
seems to demand that the new right be particularized and concrete. On the Glucksberg two-step 
approach and the “careful description” condition, see Nicolas, supra note 12, at 336–41. 
 35. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 127 n.6 (1989) (plurality opinion). See Adrian 
Vermeule, Connecting Positive and Normative Legal Theory, 10 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 387, 392 (2008) 
(questioning Scalia’s formulation); Yoshino, A New Birth, supra note 5, at 156–57 (describing the 
academic criticism of Scalia’s “most specific” standard).  
 36. See Michael H., 491 U.S. at 118–21. 
 37. Id. at 124–27. 
 38. Id. at 132 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part). 
 39. See, e.g., Cruzan v. Missouri, 497 U.S. 261 (1990); Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292 (1993); 
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 733 (1997) (rejecting the claim as “the right to determine the 
time and place of one’s own death,” and framing it instead as “the right to physician-assisted suicide”). 
But see Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 564 (2003) (framing the issue as whether the right of adults 
to have consensual sexual intimacy in their home is a protected liberty interest). 
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Glucksberg criterion in other substantive due process cases.40 
The disagreement between the majority and the dissent raises many of 
the perennial questions regarding the nature of law: Does law have a 
settled or core meaning? If so, what criteria determine which aspects of 
existing legal materials are settled or core? Is the settled or core meaning 
settled for all time, or can it develop? If it can develop, under what 
conditions can, or should, this occur? If an issue to be decided falls under 
what some jurists call the “penumbra,” rather than the core meaning of a 
provision or precedent, what method should a judge use to decide the 
controversy? In adjudicating a new case, can a judge decide the outcome 
based solely on the core meanings of existing decisions, or can he or she 
also draw on the penumbras of earlier decisions? Once a controversy 
located in the penumbra of existing law is decided, will that new decision 
affect the core or settled meaning in future cases? These and related 
questions form the heart of the debate over what used to be called the 
“concept of law.” 
Although Kennedy and Roberts are in the first instance presupposing 
different understandings of constitutional theory and the separation of 
powers, on a deeper level their positions reflect a disagreement about the 
concept of law itself. This fact is apparent in the case of their competing 
notions of the nature of substantive due process. As is detailed in what 
follows, both Justices’ statements reveal their awareness that how broadly 
or narrowly one views the reach of substantive due process is a function of 
one’s theory of law. However, both formulate that insight largely in terms 
of constitutional law rather than the broader perspective of legal theory or 
jurisprudence. In contrast, the relation between their respective views of 
the role of the judiciary is less obviously connected to a concept of law. 
The reason is that both Justices see the separation of powers as a structural 
premise of the Constitution or uncontested axiom of constitutional 
reasoning. However, as is discussed below, how one interprets the 
meaning of that constitutional norm is itself dependent upon a concept of 
law. 
II. ROBERTS’ DISSENT AND THE LEGAL THEORY OF H. L. A. HART 
How can we understand and evaluate the difference of opinion 
between Kennedy and Roberts regarding the nature of substantive due 
process? To begin, there is an obvious parallel between their disagreement 
and the debate between H. L. A. Hart and Lon Fuller as to the correct 
interpretation of the concept of law. Hart was one of the foremost legal 
positivists, and Fuller famously argued against positivism’s insistence that 
                                                      
 40. See, e.g., Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 594–96 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (framing the petitioner’s 
claim in terms of a fundamental right to engage in homosexual sodomy). 
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law and morality are conceptually distinct ideas. Hart and Fuller 
conducted a much-discussed debate on the relationship between morality 
and law that was initially published in 1958 in the Harvard Law Review 
and expanded on in their later writings.41  
Roberts argues that there has always been a core definition of marriage 
and that the changes that have occurred in society’s understanding of 
marriage over the centuries have not altered the core meaning.42 The Chief 
Justice establishes that the core meaning of marriage only entails a union 
of one man and one woman in several ways.43 Marriage, he points out, has 
always been associated with procreation and the need to provide children 
with a stable and enduring family.44 Second, every state since the 
Constitution’s ratification has assumed that marriage has this biological 
basis.45 Roberts also cites three dictionaries that define marriage in terms 
of one man and one woman as well as the Court’s own precedents to 
support his position.46 Finally, he observes that the man in the street would 
not view one of Kennedy’s allegedly transformational developments, such 
as decoupling married women’s property rights from those of their 
husband’s, as altering the definition of marriage.47 Thus, he concludes that 
the changes viewed by Kennedy as transformational did not actually affect 
the core meaning of marriage, which continues to presuppose the union of 
one man and one woman.  
Roberts’ emphasis on constitutional terms having a fixed core 
meaning recalls the theory of law elaborated by Hart. According to Hart, 
legal terms and rules contain a core meaning or standard case as well as a 
penumbra, or area in which it is unclear if a general rule or meaning 
applies, because the facts at issue exhibit some but not all of the features 
of the standard case.48 In the core or standard case, there is no ambiguity 
                                                      
 41. See infra note 48, at 55. See also articles about the Hart-Fuller debate in Symposium: Fifty 
Years Later, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 993 et seq. (2008). 
 42. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2614, 2619, 2621 (2015) (Roberts, C.J., 
dissenting).  
 43. Roberts does not say whether there are additional core components beside procreation. 
 44. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2613. Roberts does not address the fact that, under state law, 
entitlement to marriage has never required couples to be able or willing to having children. Nor does 
he note that often members of same-sex couples contribute one-half of the genetic endowment of their 
children and other same-sex couples create families by adopting children.  
 45. Id. at 2614. 
 46. Id.  
 47. Id. Cf. United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 808 (2013) (Alito, J., dissenting) (noting 
that changing notions of marriage and the family can have “profound effects” and “far-reaching 
consequences”). 
 48. See H. L .A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 12–13, 123, 126–29 (2d ed. 1994) [hereinafter 
HART, CONCEPT OF LAW]; H. L. A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals: Reply to 
Hart, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593, 607–15 (1958) [hereinafter Hart, Positivism]. The second edition of 
Hart’s Concept of Law contains a “Postscript” that was added posthumously based upon an incomplete 
chapter that Hart had intended to include in a new edition of the original work, which was published in 
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as to the meaning of the term or rule. In the penumbra, however, the 
application of the standard case is not obvious or mechanical.  Hart 
illustrates the distinction between core and penumbra with the example of 
a prohibition against “vehicles” in a park. While an automobile, 
motorcycle, or bus is clearly barred by the prohibition, Hart questions 
whether the application of the rule to bicycles, roller skates, or electrically 
propelled toy cars is equally obvious.49 Although Hart’s purpose in this 
passage is to elaborate how judges should treat the penumbra or non-
standard case, he concludes that “the hard core of settled meaning is law in 
some centrally important sense and . . . even if there are borderlines, there 
must first be lines.”50 This echoes Roberts’ concern that without clear and 
precise limits on the values recognized as fundamental by the Fourteenth 
Amendment, the rule of law will dissolve into the rule of men.51 Hart 
cautions further that “to suggest that all legal questions are fundamentally 
like those of the penumbra” amounts to asserting that “there is nothing in 
the nature of a legal rule inconsistent with all questions being open to 
reconsideration in the light of social policy.”52 
Relatedly, Roberts and Hart agree on another aspect of the concept of 
law. For Hart, the concept of law properly includes only what has been 
adopted by designated lawmaking authorities. These authorities create the 
rules whose core meanings are the fixed elements of law. It follows, for 
Hart, that as a conceptual matter, the validity of law depends upon its 
pedigree, rather than its content or substance.53 For Hart, then, the essence 
of law can, and should, be understood entirely without reference to how 
law ought to be in the moral sense of “ought.”54 However, he does not 
deny that laws can in fact serve moral or just ends or that communities 
may specifically include moral norms in their constitutions or statutes. For 
example, Hart acknowledges in the “Postscript” to The Concept of Law 
that a nation may make substantive principles of justice or moral values 
criteria of law internal to the legal system, as the United States has done in 
several of the amendments to its constitution.55 Absent such 
                                                                                                                           
1961. Because the themes developed in this article are discussed in the Postscript, I cite throughout the 
second edition. Hart also speaks of the “core of certainty” and the “penumbra of doubt.” HART, 
CONCEPT OF LAW, supra note 48, at 123. 
 49. Id. at 129; Hart, Positivism, supra note 48, at 607. 
 50. Hart, Positivism, supra note 48, at 614. 
51.  See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2622–23 (2015) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); see also id. at 
2643 (Alito, J., dissenting).  
 52. Hart, Positivism, supra note 48, at 615; see HART, CONCEPT OF LAW, supra note 48, at 152 
(stating that “though every rule may be doubtful at some points, it is a necessary condition of a legal 
system existing, that not every rule is open to doubt on all points”).  
 53. But see, however, infra notes 55 and 56 and accompanying text. For the way in which this 
works in the penumbra, see infra notes 120–22 and accompanying text.  
 54. See Hart, Positivism, supra note 48, at 606, 612–15. 
 55. HART, CONCEPT OF LAW, supra note 48, at 247, 250–51, 258 (stating that he rejects “plain 
fact” Positivism in favor of “soft” Positivism, which admits criteria of legal validity other than 
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circumstances, law is what is determined by an authoritative institution or 
source, rather than by its content, justification, or function.56 Therefore, as 
a conceptual matter, law and morality are separate; morality is not 
necessary for law to be law, even if law and morality often coincide. To 
support this position Hart notes that evil laws can and do exist.57  
Similarly, Roberts begins his dissent by noting the strength of the 
petitioners’ claims in terms of “social policy” and “fairness,” but counters 
that “judges have power to say what the law is, not what it should be.”58 
He thus rejects Kennedy’s reliance on principles and reasons that explain 
or justify existing laws, in addition to relying upon the laws themselves, 
established traditions, and settled precedents. For Kennedy, in contrast, the 
concept of law itself includes the principles and justifications for enacted 
or other conventional legal materials, so that the foundations of the right to 
marriage are part of the right itself and may be used to determine the full 
extent of the right’s meaning. Roberts’ response is blunt. Kennedy’s claim 
is pure Lochnerism59: In his view, Kennedy’s position enables the majority 
of the Court to elevate its personal view of wise treatment for same-sex 
couples to the status of a constitutional norm.60  
At the same time, Roberts does not deny the possibility of the 
judiciary creating new rights, apparently approving changes to core 
meanings under certain circumstances. To narrow the scope of this 
departure from strict adherence to the separation of powers, Roberts would 
limit new rights to values that are “objectively, deeply rooted in this 
Nation’s history and tradition” and “implicit in the concept of ordered 
                                                                                                                           
pedigree). He clarifies further that there are “variable standards” in legal systems in addition to “near-
conclusive rules.” He likens the former to what Ronald Dworkin calls “principles,” and he appears not 
to be referring specifically to legal reasoning in the penumbra because his illustrations are situations in 
which lawmakers deliberately craft legislation using general or vague terms because of the nature of 
the subject area to be regulated. See id. at 130–33, 263. Hart also does not seem to be referring to the 
principles of fairness or justice, mentioned in the text, that individual legal systems may choose to 
incorporate. See also infra note 56. 
 56. This is the point of Hart’s theory of rules of recognition, which identify the sources of legal 
rights and obligations. See LON FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 192 (rev. ed. 1969) [hereinafter 
FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW]; Brian Bix, Jules Coleman, Legal Positivism, and Legal Authority, 
16 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 241, 245 (1996). In addition to “pedigree,” Hart speaks of law’s “social 
sources,” which include legislation, the decisions of courts, and “social customs.” See HART, CONCEPT 
OF LAW, supra note 48, at 101, 269. 
 57. See Hart, Positivism, supra note 48, at 596 (quoting Austin). For Hart and other positivists, 
the claim that law must have a moral dimension is not only inaccurate; it is also dangerous. See id. at 
598. 
 58. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2611 (2015).  
59.  For a pungent critique of Roberts’ Lochner claim, see Louis Michael Seidman, The 
Triumph of Gay Marriage and the Failure of Constitutional Law, 2015 SUP. CT. REV. 115, 124–26 
(2015). 
 60. See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2612, 2616–19, 2621 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); see also id. at 
2630–31 (Scalia, J., dissenting); id. at 2631 (Thomas, J., dissenting); id. at 2640–41 (Alito, J., 
dissenting). 
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liberty.”61 This would protect the law’s core meanings by cabining judicial 
discretion by anchoring it to longstanding and widely accepted beliefs. 
Although Roberts and the other Justices express the forgoing concerns in 
many areas of law, they seem especially anxious in connection with family 
law, fearing that Kennedy’s methodology will undermine any basis for 
states to continue prohibiting plural or incestuous marriages.62 
Both Roberts and legal positivism voice concern that linking the 
legitimacy of law to its moral character could have dangerous 
consequences. Yet, their fears are not parallel. One of the consequences 
mentioned by Hart is the potential for anarchy if individuals can dismiss as 
invalid laws lacking the moral norms they espouse or embodying moral 
norms at odds with their moral views.63 In that event, people’s expectation 
that law must be moral to be valid could lead them to acts of disobedience 
based upon their own moral views. To the extent that Roberts focuses on 
the potential for “anarchy,” his concern is that Supreme Court Justices will 
demand that constitutional doctrine embody their personal notions of 
justice and morality.64 At most, Roberts may allude to Hart’s concern 
indirectly when he says that the majority’s holding is dangerous for the 
rule of law.65 Since in the United States, it is axiomatic that there is a 
multiplicity of divergent views on most matters of moment, legitimacy 
and, therefore, stability depends upon respect for the rule of law. That 
respect, Roberts argues, depends on people’s faith in the democratic 
processes, and the legitimacy of the courts depends upon judges rendering 
judgments consistent with the integrity of those processes.   
                                                      
 61. Id. at 2618 (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720–21 (1997)) (Roberts, 
C.J., dissenting). Roberts concludes that Kennedy’s opinion “effectively overrule[s] Glucksberg.” Id. 
at 2621 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 62. See id. at 2621–22 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (asking how to distinguish plural marriage 
from same-sex marriage and stating that plural marriages might “compel different legal analysis”); see 
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 599 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting); see Transcript of Oral Argument 
at 5, Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (No. 14-556 Question 2) (Scalia wondering if a 
state would have to recognize the marriages of a man who had married multiple wives in a country 
permitting polygamy); see also Michael J. Higdon, Polygamous Marriage, Monogamous Divorce, 67 
DUKE L.J. 79 (2017); Y. Carson Zhou, The Incest Horrible: Delimiting the Lawrence v. Texas Right to 
Sexual Autonomy, 23 MICH. J. GENDER & L.187 (2016) (arguing that there is no legal basis for 
excluding incestuous relationships from the fundamental right to intimacy in many cases and 
suggesting that norms against such relationships are in the process of changing). 
 63. See Hart, Positivism, supra note 48, at 597–98. The second danger of denying the 
separability of law and morality noted by Hart goes in a different direction; it is the general weakening 
of citizens’ moral beliefs when duly enacted laws of their country reflect questionable or even 
reprehensible moral norms. The fear expressed by legal positivists is that because of their expectation 
that law necessarily reflects morality, unjust laws will undermine citizens’ moral compass–something 
that some observers claim contributed to citizen apathy in Nazi Germany. See id. at 597–99, 616. 
Roberts and the other dissenters do not mention this concern in their opinions. Justice Scalia 
mentioned the potential for anarchy as a reason not to employ the compelling reason standard to 
regulation in Emp’t Div., Dept. of Human Res. of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 888 (1990).   
 64. See supra note 60 and accompanying text. 
 65. See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2622 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
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III. KENNEDY’S OPINION AND THE LEGAL THEORY OF LON FULLER 
Kennedy’s method for determining which rights are fundamental, 
especially his recourse to the meaning of marriage based on a combination 
of its history and justifications advanced in Supreme Court precedents that 
consider marriage fundamental, bears an obvious resemblance to Lon 
Fuller’s understanding of the concept of law. Similarly, the criticism 
leveled against Kennedy, that he has imported his subjective ideas of 
justice or morality, parallels the criticisms leveled against Fuller for his 
purposive theory of law. 
Fuller argues that law cannot be understood adequately without 
understanding it as a purposeful enterprise and that individual legal 
precepts are fully intelligible only by taking into account their purposes 
when elucidating their terms.66 He contrasts his view with that of Hart and 
other positivists who try to define law in terms of the authority of the 
lawmaking body that created it.67  Hart’s theory of the core and penumbra, 
according to Fuller, reflects the positivist perspective because it posits that 
a word or rule’s standard instance can be understood solely in terms of its 
semantic features rather than as reflecting the context or purpose that 
explains, justifies, or otherwise renders the term or rule meaningful.68  
Fuller counters that the purpose is always an essential ingredient of a legal 
text, but that we frequently do not refer to its purpose because the purpose,   
                                                      
 66. See FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW, supra note 56, at 145–51; see Lon L. Fuller, 
Positivism and Fidelity to Law–A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARV. L. REV. 630, 662–69 (1958) 
[hereinafter Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity]. 
 67. See FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW, supra note 56, at 137, 192. Hart acknowledges that 
moral values can also be part of this process, but only if a lawmaking authority has incorporated such 
values into the legal materials. See supra note 55 and accompanying text. 
 68. See Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity, supra note 66, at 661–64. The connection implied 
between semantic inquiries and preoccupation with institutional authority seems to be that focus on the 
originator of laws leads to a parallel focus on what the originator’s legal product means rather than 
focusing on why the originator chose to create that product. For a useful discussion of purposive 
interpretation of statutes and a short history of its role in twentieth century Supreme Court decisions, 
see Donald G. Gifford et al., A Case Study in the Superiority of the Purposive Approach to Statutory 
Interpretation: Bruesewitz v. Wyeth, 64 S.C. L. REV. 221, 231–35 (2012). 
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and thus the sense of the text, is obvious.69  This has led people to assume, 
wrongly, that there are standard instances of a term or a rule that are fixed 
and can be understood without reference to their purpose—what Fuller 
calls “an inert datum of meaning,”70 namely, a self-sufficient axiom of 
legal reasoning.  
To bring home his objection, Fuller returns to Hart’s example of the 
prohibition against vehicles in a park. For Hart, the core meaning or 
standard instance of “vehicle” was a car or similar conveyance. Fuller 
offers a hypothetical in which “local patriots” want to create a memorial to 
World War II by placing a working military truck in the park. Fuller asks 
whether others who use the park and find the proposed monument an eye-
sore could convince a judge to bar it as a clear example of the standard 
case of the prohibition, given that the truck has all the features of the 
vehicles clearly banned.71 Fuller’s point is that even a single, everyday 
word contained in a rule may not be correctly understood without recourse 
to the purpose of the rule, since the outcome of the patriots’ truck 
hypothetical would depend upon the goal of the prohibition,72 i.e., whether 
the purpose was to reduce noise, preserve clean air, create a pastoral 
environment, assure a safe place for children to play, etc.  
As previously noted, Hart supported his theory that law and morality 
are fundamentally separate ideas, in part, by observing that evil laws can 
and do exist.73 Fuller does not deny this fact. His position is not that laws 
must promote an objective or extrinsic good to be law, as natural law 
theory is thought to require.74 Rather, he argues that law must embody an 
“inner morality,” which includes requiring legal rules to observe certain 
canons, such as being general in scope, public or transparent, feasible to 
                                                      
 69. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity, supra note 66, at 663. 
 70. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity, supra note 66, at 669. See FULLER, THE MORALITY OF 
LAW, supra note 56, at 156 (calling vacuous “the view that law simply expresses a datum of 
legitimated social power”). Fuller directs this critique at Hart’s account of the core or standard 
instance. He acknowledges that Hart agrees that judges rely on the purpose of a rule or term in the 
penumbra. See Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity, supra note 66, at 662, and infra notes 73–75 and 
accompanying text. In FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW, supra note 56, at 146, in contrast, Fuller 
appears to recognize that positivists accept the idea of individual rules as purposeful, but not 
institutions or legal systems as a whole. 
 71. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity, supra note 66, at 663.  
 72. See id. He illustrates his point with two other examples where the meaning of a term varies 
greatly depending upon the surrounding context. See id. at 664–67. 
 73. See supra note 57 and accompanying text. 
 74. See FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW, supra note 56, at 153 (stating that the inner morality 
of law may be “indifferent to the substantive aims of law”), 155–56 (distinguishing between law, 
which exhibits an “inner morality,” and good law); LON L. FULLER, THE LAW IN QUEST OF ITSELF 
100–01, 110 (1940); Lon L. Fuller, American Legal Philosophy at Mid-Century, 6 J. LEGAL EDUC. 
457, 467 (1954) [hereinafter Fuller, American Legal Philosophy]; see also Philip Soper, In Defense of 
Classical Natural Law in Legal Theory: Why Unjust Law is No Law at All, 20 CAN. J.L. & JURIS. 201, 
202 (2007) (distinguishing between natural law theorists who believe that immoral laws are not legally 
binding and those who believe that they may be legally binding, but not morally obligatory). 
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obey, consistent with each other, clearly stated, and stable over time.75 
Although norms of this kind may be observed by regimes that enact evil 
laws, Fuller claims that the inner morality of law cannot be construed as 
merely stating procedural norms required for law to be effective.76 Rather, 
he says, a legal system is impossible without “general acceptance” by 
those subject to the law, which presupposes “an appreciation of the 
reasons why these rules [of law] are necessary.”77 The “habit of 
obedience” to laws78 that some believe can ensure a regime’s stability 
itself depends on people possessing certain attitudes. In other words, “it is 
clear that the obligation of fidelity to positive law cannot itself be derived 
from positive law.”79 In short, for Fuller, law can command specific 
behaviors, and reinforce those commands with sanctions, but it cannot 
command willing law-abidingness without itself containing the inner 
morality of law.80  
Fuller makes a further, more questionable assertion, namely that a 
legal system that observes the inner morality of law will tend toward 
promoting outcomes that meet an external moral standard, by “working 
itself pure.”81 In this regard, he notes that many of the worst excesses of 
the Nazis occurred when they disregarded the requirements or content of 
their own enacted laws.82 More generally, he expresses doubts that an “evil 
monarch” pursuing “the most iniquitous ends” would consistently observe 
                                                      
 75. See FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW, supra note 56, at 33–41. These standards are 
elaborated in id. at 46–91. In addition, Fuller believes that laws must usually, though not invariably, be 
prospective and must be administered consistent with their terms to be valid. He adds that “a total 
failure” of any of the canons he lists would cause a “legal system” to cease to be valid, i.e., to 
command our obedience as a moral obligation. See id. at 39. 
 76. See FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW, supra note 56, at 200–04. 
 77. Id. at 463. 
 78. Id. at 465. 
 79. Id. at 468. 
 80. See Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity, supra note 66, at 656. See also Fuller, American Legal 
Philosophy, supra note 74, at 462 (observing that “[m]any Americans” believe law is grounded in 
physical force and “resist strongly any suggestion” that rests upon “a moral power, reflecting the 
persuasive force of accepted rules”), 484 (stating that “[l]egal positivism has been unable out of its 
own resources to construct any justification or explanation for the obligatory force of law”); FULLER, 
THE MORALITY OF LAW, supra note 56, at 39. Some commentators have disputed Fuller’s claim that 
the standards he lists create a moral basis for obeying the law. See Marshall Cohen, Law, Morality and 
Purpose, 10 VILLANOVA L. REV. 640, 650–54 (1965). 
 81. See Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity, supra note 66 at 636–37; FULLER, THE MORALITY OF 
LAW, supra note 56, at 157–59. The phrase was used by Lord Mansfield, when he was Solicitor-
General, in reference to the common law. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity, supra note 66, at 668. Fuller 
calls the inner morality of law a “morality of aspiration,” which he explains as the challenge of 
excellence, FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW, supra note 56, at 170, which he contrasts with the 
morality of duty. Id. at 5–8, 170. Yet he also asserts that the inner morality of law is a continuum, at 
the lower end of which is a duty of obedience. Id. at 42.  
 82. See Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity, supra note 66, at 650–55. If it is true that the Nazis 
were reluctant to make public the more reprehensible methods they used to terrorize the population, 
this fact may suggest that the regime would have committed fewer atrocities if it had felt bound to 
observe the usual processes for lawmaking and adjudication.  
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY JURISPRUDENCE REVIEW [VOL. 11:2 
 
 
272 
the “principles of legality.”83 With this claim, Fuller appears to seek to 
reach a natural law outcome indirectly, without endorsing natural law 
principles or methods.84 
Fuller thus sees the connection between his understanding that views 
purpose as an essential ingredient of law and the concept of law as 
inherently moral.  As a consequence, he appreciates that positivists seem 
to fear “anarchy” if core meanings are open to purposive interpretation, 
that is, judges could manipulate the meaning of laws by appealing to their 
own interpretation of a law’s unstated purpose.85 This would enable each 
judge to inject his or her personal moral preferences into what will become 
codified as law.86 In fact, Fuller agrees that positivists are right to fear 
potential abuses of purposive interpretations because “interpretation may 
be pushed too far” and judges could conceivably use the underlying 
rationale of a statute to reach results inconsistent with the obvious 
meaning of a literal text.87 
Fuller argues that what positivists fear the most, however, is 
“tyranny,” that is, the potential for coercive rulings that would threaten 
“human freedom and human dignity.”88 He illustrates this threat by 
depicting a jurisdiction that prohibits golf on Sundays in order to 
encourage people to attend church, a result he seemingly dislikes, but 
labels merely an “inconvenience.”89 Some people, he adds, may fear that 
the purposive approach to interpretation could also encourage more 
objectionable measures to force people to attend church, such as expressly 
requiring them to attend church or even to “kneel and recite prayers.”90 For 
Fuller, this phenomenon, which he calls “impressed purpose,” is in fact “a 
crucial one in our society,” and he cites as examples the National Labor 
Relations Act’s directive to bargain in good faith and a state statute 
compelling students to salute the American flag, which was initially 
                                                      
 83. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW, supra note 56, at 154. 
84.  See supra note 74 and accompanying text; see also infra note 94 and accompanying text. 
 85. See Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity, supra note 66, at 670–71. 
 86. See id. at 670. Fuller, however, believes that the positivists’ deepest fear is otherwise. See 
infra notes 88–94 and accompanying text. 
 87. See Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity, supra note 66, at 669–70. Fuller’s example of the latter 
is a hypothetical ruling that a statute prohibiting the sale of absinthe could be interpreted as requiring 
the sale of absinthe because the goal of the statute is to promote health and it is well established that 
absinthe promotes health. See Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 134 U.S. 457 (1892). Fuller 
himself approves of courts interpreting the constitutional prohibition against “impairing the obligation 
of contracts” to include a prohibition against enhancing contractual obligations because, in his view, 
the reason for the constitutional provision was opposition to retroactive legislation. FULLER, THE 
MORALITY OF LAW, supra note 56, at 103.  
 88. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity, supra note 66, at 670–71. Fuller says that, although the 
threat is real, a better solution to the problem is for judges to be constrained by the “structural 
integrity” of a statutory or common law rule. See id. at 670 (equating this with the intent of a statute 
and conceding that his answer lacks precision). 
 89. Id. at 671. 
 90. Id. 
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upheld by the Supreme Court.91 He concludes that the problem of 
government directives requiring people to act in a certain way, as 
contrasted with requirements to refrain from acting in certain ways,92 is 
increasingly acute because of the government’s growing role in economic 
affairs.93 Elsewhere Fuller explains the positivist’s fear more simply, 
namely, as the suspicion that introducing natural law concepts into law 
could lead to “fastening on society some all-embracing orthodoxy.”94 If he 
is correct about their fears, Fuller’s inner morality of law would not appear 
to create a threat of that kind.95 
Assuming that Fuller is correct about the impetus for Hart’s rejection 
of purposive interpretations of the core or standard instance of a term or 
rule, how likely is such a situation to arise? Is Kennedy’s reasoning in 
Obergefell an example of Fuller’s purposive interpretation, and if so, does 
it create the type of coercive result that Fuller believes is problematic? The 
key passage in the decision is Kennedy’s analysis of the “basic reasons 
why the right to marry has been long protected.”96 These reasons, Kennedy 
says, are revealed through the Court’s precedents that “have identified 
essential attributes of that right based in history, tradition, and other 
constitutional liberties inherent in this intimate bond.”97 Four “principles 
and traditions,” he argues, ground those precedents and they “apply with 
equal force to same-sex couples.”98 
The first principle that Kennedy discusses is that the ability to get 
married is a right “inherent in the concept of individual autonomy.”99 The 
                                                      
 91. Id. The Court’s flag salute holding was overturned three years later. See Minersville Sch. 
Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940), overruled by W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 
624 (1943). 
 92. Fuller thus anticipated the distinction made by contemporary theorists between Fourteenth 
Amendment liberty understood as negative rights, i.e., rights protected from government interference, 
and affirmative rights, i.e., rights that “requir[e] . . . the active participation of the state.” See Susan 
Frelich Appleton, Obergefell’s Liberties–It’s All in the Family, 77 OHIO ST. L.J. 919, 931–32 (2016). 
 93. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity, supra note 66, at 672. See Luke P. Norris, Constitutional 
Economics: Lochner, Labor, and the Battle for Liberty, 28 YALE J. LAW & HUMANITIES 1 (2016) 
(arguing that the courts’ substantive due process jurisprudence in economic affairs laid the foundation 
for the non-economic substantive due process rulings in Griswold v. Connecticut and the Fourteenth 
Amendment personal liberty cases decided after that); see also Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 
486 (1965). 
 94.  Fuller, American Legal Philosophy, supra note 74, at 463. Fuller labels the positivist’s 
desire to conceive of law as “ideologically neutral” as itself a “moral motivation.” Id. 
 95.  Fuller associates external notions of morality with what he calls “the morality of 
aspiration,” while the inner morality of law seems to demand only a minimal degree of “the morality 
of duty.” See FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW, supra note 56, at 4–5, 40–46. For a concise summary 
of those who argue that Fuller’s inner morality amounts to the conditions of efficiency, not morality, 
see Peter P. Nicholson, The Internal Morality of Law: Fuller and His Critics, 48 ETHICS 307 (1974). 
 96.  135 S. Ct. 2584, 2599 (2015). 
 97.  Id. at 2598. 
 98.  Id. at 2599. 
 99.  Id.  
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two precedents he cites for the relationship between autonomy and the 
decision to marry are Loving v. Virginia100 and Zablocki v. Redhail.101 
Loving struck down a state’s prohibition of interracial marriage; Zablocki 
invalidated a state statute that attempted to prevent persons in arrears in 
child support from marrying. In Loving, although the state statute was 
invalidated primarily on equal protection grounds, the Court also stated 
that it violated the due process clause because it inhibited a person’s 
“freedom of choice to marry,” “[t]he freedom to marry has long been 
recognized as one of the vital personal rights essential to the orderly 
pursuit of happiness by free men,” and “the freedom to marry or not marry 
. . . resides with the individual.”102 Zablocki repeated the language of 
Loving and subsequent cases based on it.103 The Zablocki Court noted that 
the Loving Court could have decided the case exclusively on equal 
protection grounds, but deliberately chose to include the due process 
dimension of the right in question.104 The Zablocki Court also quoted the 
reference in Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur to precedents 
recognizing “the freedom of personal choice in matters of marriage and 
family life” as part of the liberty protected by the Fourteenth 
Amendment.105  
All of these decisions focus on the importance of individuals’ ability 
to make choices that bear directly on the personal relationships that are 
central to their identity. Thus, they rely on the purpose they attribute to the 
liberty prong of the Fourteenth Amendment due process clause, as it 
relates to the decision to marry. Kennedy then argues that same-sex 
couples are similarly protected because the choice to marry shapes their 
destiny and contributes to their identity in the same way as for 
                                                      
 100.  388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
 101.  434 U.S. 374 (1978). These two cases discuss liberty, not autonomy, but Kennedy appears 
to equate the two. See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2599; Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 574 (2003) 
(quoting Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) (plurality opinion by Justices 
O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ.)). In Lawrence, Kennedy states that “[l]iberty presumes an 
autonomy of self that includes freedom of thought, belief, expression, and certain intimate conduct.” 
539 U.S. at 562. Philosophers and political theorists sometimes distinguish freedom and autonomy. 
See, e.g., Thomas Nys, Re-Sourcing The Self? Isaiah Berlin and Charles Taylor and the Tension 
Between Freedom and Autonomy, 11 ETHICAL PERSPECTIVES 215 (2004); John Christman, Saving 
Positive Freedom, 33 POL. THEORY 79 (2005). 
 102.  388 U.S. at 12. The second quotation derives from Meyer v. Nebraska, which upheld the 
rights of teachers, students, and parents to have German taught in public schools on the grounds that 
the Fourteenth Amendment guarantee of liberty included: 
[T]he right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, 
to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship 
God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges 
long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men. 
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 399, 399 (1923) 
103.  See Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 383–87. 
104.  Id. at 383. 
 105.  Id. at 385 (citing Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639–40 (1974)). 
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heterosexual couples.106 Kennedy does not assert the purpose underlying 
the precedents out of whole cloth, given that the precedents he cites make 
explicit the underlying purposes of liberty in the Fourteenth Amendment 
and its connection to the right to marry. Rather, Kennedy applies the 
principles enunciated in the earlier cases to a new set of facts that arguably 
are comprehended by the principles stated.107 At the same time, Kennedy’s 
opinion illustrates how earlier decisions articulating general and abstract 
principles underlying their holdings, allow, if not invite further expansions 
of the meanings of the terms in question, e.g., liberty and marriage, 
without offering guidance as to the limits of such expansions. 
Shifting from the significance of the right to marry for human agency 
to the unique character of the object of choice at issue, Kennedy’s second 
principle relies upon Supreme Court precedents emphasizing the 
characteristics of the marital relationship when they strike down state laws 
that interfere with the right to marry or the right to obtain contraception.108 
These decisions justify their holdings based upon the intimacy and nobility 
that a committed marriage makes possible. In addition to Griswold v. 
Connecticut,109 the pioneering contraception decision, Kennedy relies 
upon Turner v. Safley, which held the right of prisoners to marry without a 
warden’s permission was protected by the liberty provision of the 
Fourteenth Amendment because such marriages are “expressions of 
emotional support and public commitment” as well as “personal 
dedication,” even though they cannot be consummated while the prisoner 
is incarcerated.110 Thus, although prisoners are the archetype of persons 
who cannot claim the autonomy and personal choice protected for citizens 
in general, Safley found their claim to marry was fundamental because of 
the nature of the spiritual bond fostered by the relationship they were 
seeking. Kennedy then concludes that the rationale of these precedents, 
namely, the uniqueness of the marital relationship, applies with equal 
force to unions between same-sex parties. 
The third justification for classifying marriage a fundamental right is 
its role in creating a union that protects the rights of families, parents, and 
children. In particular, the Court has asserted these rights as fundamental 
alongside the right to marry in cases invalidating state laws interfering 
with parents’ decisions regarding their children’s education.111 Similarly, 
                                                      
 106.  See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2599 (2015).  
 107.  From Fuller’s point of view, this may be a distinction without a difference, given that the 
result, as stated in what follows, is impressed coercion. 
 108.  See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2599–600.  
 109.  381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
 110.  See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 95–96 (1987).  
 111.  See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2600–601 (citing Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 399 (1923) 
and Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925)). 
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when the Court in Moore v. City of Cleveland confronted a local housing 
ordinance preventing a grandparent from raising her grandchildren in her 
home, it said: 
[U]nless we close our eyes to the basic reasons why certain rights 
associated with the family have been accorded shelter under the 
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause, we cannot avoid 
applying the force and rationale of these precedents to the family 
choice involved in this case.112  
Kennedy emphasizes that the existence of marriage facilitates the 
emotional as well as the material well-being of family units, which 
increases the likelihood that children will experience a stable family life 
and not suffer stigma because of their parents’ relationship.113 Here, too, 
Kennedy concludes that the Constitution’s protection for traditional and 
other non-traditional family units applies equally to families created by 
same-sex couples.  
Finally, the fourth rationale drawn upon by Kennedy emphasizes the 
role of marriage as a social institution. He cites Maynard v. Hill,114 in 
which the plaintiffs claimed that a state divorce law interfered with their 
rights protected by the contracts clause of the Constitution. In rejecting 
their claim, the Court argued that marriage is an institution, not simply a 
contract, and that “it is the foundation of the family and of society, without 
which there would be neither civilization nor progress.”115 Kennedy 
reinforces the institutional significance of marriage with the statistic that 
“over a thousand provisions of federal law” reference the marital status of 
those affected.116 He concludes that same-sex unions have the same social 
significance as heterosexual ones and, thus, the rights and obligations 
conferred upon traditional married couples should also benefit and bind 
same-sex partners to one another and their children.117  
Kennedy’s analysis is clearly an example of purposive interpretation 
because he looks to the purpose of protecting marriage under the liberty 
provision of the Fourteenth Amendment, as elaborated in numerous 
precedents, to arrive at his determination that same-sex marriage deserves 
the same protections as marriage between opposite-sex couples. Further, it 
seems to align with what Fuller called impressed purpose because, as 
Fuller foresaw, Obergefell’s holding will force all state and federal 
                                                      
 112. Moore v. City of Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 501 (1977) (emphasis added). 
 113. See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2600–601 (citing United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744 
(2013)).  
 114. 125 U.S. 190 (1888). 
 115.  Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2601 (citing Maynard, 125 U.S. at 211).  
116.  Id. (citing Windsor, 570 U.S. at 764–68). 
 117.  See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2600–601. The Court in Safley, 482 U.S. at 96, relied upon a 
similar argument, which Kennedy’s Obergefell reasoning closely tracks.  
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authorities to abide by what is arguably an “all-embracing orthodoxy.”118 
Unlike the examples Fuller criticizes,119 in which the state imposes 
specific behavior on individuals, Kennedy’s opinion avoids requiring 
individuals to engage in or even endorse gay marriage themselves.  At the 
same time, the Obergefell holding has raised concerns that private parties 
will be coerced into affirmative actions that contradict their own moral or 
religious beliefs as a result of the decisions, e.g., being forced to provide 
commercial services for gay marriages.120 Since the Supreme Court has 
not yet decided if Obergefell’s conclusion protecting the right of same-sex 
couples to marry will require commercial entities to treat gay marriages 
identically to heterosexual ones, it is too soon to know whether Fuller’s 
fear of impressed orthodoxy will be a result of the decision.  
Kennedy’s recourse to the purpose of the marriage precedents under 
the Fourteenth Amendment’s liberty prong also appears to leave him open 
to the claim made by Roberts and Scalia that his reasoning provides no 
justification for preventing the possible expansion of the right to marry to 
plural marriages.121 As Scalia noted in his dissent in Lawrence, it may no 
longer be possible to uphold government restrictions on behavior because 
of moral norms.122 This concern is not frivolous: It is likely that plaintiffs 
will have standing to challenge anti-polygamy laws before the Supreme 
Court,123 and it is not obvious that today’s Court would adopt the 
reasoning employed at the end of the nineteenth century to uphold anti-
polygamy measures.124 
Kennedy’s reasoning in Obergefell thus can be considered an example 
of Fuller’s concept of law as inherently purposive. In contrast, Roberts’ 
                                                      
 118.   See supra note 91 and accompanying text. 
 119.   See supra notes 88–94 and accompanying text. 
 120.   See Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018) 
(reversing the lower court decision requiring the baker to make a custom cake for a gay couple’s 
wedding, but without ruling on the merits of the state public accommodations law challenge); 
Washington v. Arlene’s Flowers, Inc., 389 P.3d 543 (Wash. 2017), vacated and remanded, 138 S. Ct. 
2671 (2018) (requesting reconsideration in light of Masterpiece Cakeshop); see also Letter from John 
A. Koskinen, Commissioner, Internal Revenue Service, to E. Scott Pruitt, Attorney General [of 
Oklahoma] (July 30, 2015) (stating that the IRS “does not intend to change the standards that it applies 
to section 501(c)(3) organizations by reason of the Obergefell decision”), 
http://www.ok.gov/oag/documents/IRS%20Response%20Letter%20Obergefell.pdf. 
 121.  See supra note 62 and accompanying text. 
 122.  Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 599 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting). However, Roberts 
appears to have laid the predicate for distinguishing plural marriage from same-sex marriage as a 
matter of constitutional law in his dissent in Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2622 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 123.  See Brown v. Buhman, 947 F. Supp. 2d 1170 (D. Utah 2013) (invalidating Utah statute as 
applied to cohabitation and religious plural marriages but upholding it as applied to civil plural 
marriage), vacated Brown v. Buhman, 822 F.3d 1151 (10th Cir. 2016); see also Bronson v. Swensen, 
500 F.3d 1099 (2007). 
 124.  See Late Corp. of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. United States, 136 U.S. 1 
(1890); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. (8 Otto.) 145 (1878). Gay marriage and polygamy can, 
however, be constitutionally distinguished.  See Seidman, supra note 59, at 140. 
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dissent shares several features of Hart’s positivist concept of law. The 
opposition between Kennedy and Roberts is not, however, as complete as 
the preceding discussion suggests. In Part IV, I argue that Roberts in fact 
exercises judicial discretion to a greater degree than appears initially. This 
narrows the divide separating Roberts and Kennedy. Further, in Part V, I 
argue that Kennedy’s reasoning in Obergefell represents a restrained form 
of purposivism. If correct, this fact further undermines the sharpness of the 
contrast between the two Justices that commentators have noted and that 
the preceding legal theory analysis supports. 
IV. THE HART-ROBERTS COMPARISON REVISITED 
Although Hart and Roberts agree upon the importance of protecting 
core legal meanings and precepts, they would disagree about the proper 
method to guide judges operating in the penumbra, that is, when 
confronting new and potentially contested situations. Hart agrees with 
Roberts that judges should not exercise their discretion by making 
decisions in the penumbra based upon their personal opinions. Just as 
judges’ decisions in the penumbra cannot be mechanical, they should also 
not be arbitrary.125 Yet he disagrees with Roberts that a judge’s discretion 
should be guided primarily or exclusively by precedent and established 
traditions. Rather, for Hart, in applying law to concrete facts in the 
penumbra, judges should be guided by social utility, i.e., “by the growing 
needs of society,”126 which are reflected in “various aims and policies.”127 
In other words, the judge should look forward, not backward.  
The disagreement between Roberts and Hart is much deeper than 
whether a judge should look to the past or the future when confronting 
circumstances not obviously covered by an existing rule. Their 
disagreement is about the concept of law itself. For Hart, judges who 
imagine that they can avoid legislating by confining themselves to 
semantic features of terms or rules,128 or to their meanings in “ordinary 
nonlegal contexts to ordinary men,”129 are simply mistaken about the 
nature of law, which is inherently incomplete. Law’s incompleteness 
obligates judges to assume a creative role when existing law does not 
clearly determine the holding in a given case.130 Hart might then say that 
                                                      
  
 125.  See HART, CONCEPT OF LAW, supra note 48, at 204–05; Hart, Positivism, supra note 48, at 
614 (labeling the opposite of mechanical decisions “intelligent and purposive” judgments).  
 126.  See Hart, Positivism, supra note 48, at 612, 614. 
 127.  Id. at 614. That social utility and public policy may be contested goals would not make the 
judge’s recourse to them arbitrary or idiosyncratic in Hart’s view.  See supra note 125. 
 128.  See HART, CONCEPT OF LAW, supra note 48, at 129–30. 
 129.  Hart, Positivism, supra note 48, at 611.  
 130.  See Hart, Positivism, supra note 48, at 608–13, 628–29; HART, CONCEPT OF LAW, supra 
note 48, at 272–76. Hart does not explicitly discuss limits to a judge’s discretion in the penumbra, in 
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Roberts misunderstands the nature of law when he defends the 
conventional definition of marriage by citing three nineteenth century 
dictionaries and noting that the man in the street would not have 
recognized changes in women’s property rights as an essential part of 
marriage.131 
What Hart calls the “open-texture” of law is due to two things. First is 
the characteristics of language, which is “irreducibly open-textured” 
because of the necessity of rules to employ “general classifying terms in 
any form of communication concerning matters of fact.”132 In addition, 
Hart attributes the open-texture of law to “the human predicament,” which 
consists of people’s relative ignorance of what the future will bring, that 
is, the “unenvisioned case.”133 Unenvisioned cases are fact patterns 
“continually thrown up by nature or human invention, which possess only 
some of the features of the plain cases but other features that they lack.”134 
The combination of the indeterminacy of language and the indeterminacy 
of facts will require a judge to decide whether a new case resembles the 
settled or paradigm case in the relevant respects and to a great enough 
degree to justify including it as an instance of the existing law.135 That 
decision, Hart insists, is a choice, although some judges prefer to disguise 
or minimize the element of choice involved.136 The alternative, which Hart 
                                                                                                                           
part because his purpose is to counter the views of formalists, on the one hand, and those of natural 
law theorists, on the other.  See BRIAN BIX, JURISPRUDENCE: THEORY AND CONTEXT 45–47 (6th ed. 
2012); see also supra note 125 (describing the judge’s decisions as “intelligent and purposive 
judgments”); infra note 146 and accompanying text (suggesting that penumbral decisions are relatively 
rare). 
 131.  See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2614 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 132.  HART, CONCEPT OF LAW, supra note 48, at 128. Hart does, however, note that even “very 
general standards” produce “plain indisputable examples of what does, or does not, satisfy them.” Id. 
at 131. For Madison’s parallel lament over the imprecision of language, see FEDERALIST PAPERS No. 
37 (noting several reasons for the ambiguity of laws and stating that even the utterances of God to 
mankind are rendered “dim and doubtful by the cloudy medium” of language). I am grateful to Sandy 
Levinson for noting the parallel with Madison. 
 133.  HART, CONCEPT OF LAW, supra note 48, at 128–29. Nicos Stavropoulos points out that the 
indeterminacy caused by unenvisioned cases has two distinct sources: our inability to describe in 
advance all possible cases as well as our inability in the present to know how we will want to judge 
some new cases in the future. See Nicos Stavropoulos, Hart’s Semantics, in HART’S POSTSCRIPT. 
ESSAYS ON THE POSTSCRIPT TO THE CONCEPT OF LAW 59, 93 (Jules Coleman ed.,  2001). 
Stavropoulos also notes that Hart treats the effect of the law’s indeterminacy in the different cases 
identically. See id. at 90. 
 134.  HART, CONCEPT OF LAW, supra note 48, at 126.  
 135.  See id. at 127, 129. Hart also cautions that the degree of indeterminacy varies by field 
within a particular legal system as well as between legal systems. See id. at 130–31. He singles out the 
standard of “due care” in tort law as an especially amorphous standard. Id. at 132–33. 
 136.  See HART, CONCEPT OF LAW, supra note 48, at 129; see also Hart, Positivism, supra note 
48, at 608–09 (quoting John Austin and Jerome Frank for recognizing the necessity for judges to 
legislate). Since one of the elements driving a judicial decision in the penumbra is the aim of the rule 
in question, Hart adds that the process of filling out the contours of the meaning of a rule can have the 
effect of making the nature of the end of the rule more determinate. See HART, CONCEPT OF LAW, 
supra note 48, at 128–29. Although he says this process makes the aim more determinate, the example 
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rejects, is to settle “in advance, but also in the dark, issues which can only 
reasonably be settled when they arise and are identified.”137 Open texture 
thus potentially improves judicial decisions, at the same time that it makes 
them more difficult, because it enables judges to fine tune their judgments 
by including or excluding, in legal classifications, instances that promote 
rather than thwart a rule’s aims.138 
As a consequence of his view of the inherent incompleteness of law, 
Hart sees the decision of a judge to ignore changing societal needs as a 
“choice,” not a necessity. In fact, he says, judges who claim they avoid 
making policy judgments are in fact making policy judgments, only they 
make them in light of conservative social aims instead of contemporary 
needs.139 This often occurs, for Hart, when a judge “disclaims any . . .  
creative function” and casts his search instead for “the intention of the 
legislature.”140 The issue, then, for Hart is not whether judges choose or 
avoid injecting social policy into decisions in the penumbra, but which 
social policy they choose, conservative or contemporary. To critics who 
would castigate judges deliberately interpreting ambiguous or vague 
language in light of social policy for usurping the legislative function in 
violation of the separation of powers, Hart would reply that the incomplete 
nature of law may force judges, whenever existing law does not clearly 
dictate the outcome, to choose outcomes rather than merely discover what 
is latent in existing legal materials.141 
Hart does, however, add that those penumbral judgments are not law 
in the same strong sense as the core or standard instances that they 
supplement.142 Hence, if one labels a judge’s creative acts in the penumbra 
“legislation,” as Hart does, it is legislation of a different kind than the 
enactments of legislatures. He calls this aspect of judicial activity, which 
occurs in the penumbra, “law-creating discretion,” and characterizes it as 
“a restricted law-making function” because it is legitimately exercised 
only where enacted or standard instances of law are inadequate to resolve 
an unanticipated case.143 Courts “exercise a genuine though interstitial 
law-making power” in such gaps.144 Sometimes Hart gives the impression 
                                                                                                                           
he gives seems to entail revising the aim to address changing circumstances. See Stavropoulos, supra 
note 133, at 93. 
 137.  HART, CONCEPT OF LAW, supra note 48, at 130. 
 138.  See id. 
 139.  See Hart, Positivism, supra note 48, at 611. Similarly, some social scientists have argued 
that the justices tend to cite documents from the founding period more for ideological, rhetorical, or 
strategic reasons than because they are guided by the founders’ intent. See Pamela C. Corley, Robert 
M. Howard, & David C. Nixon, The Supreme Court and Opinion Content: The Use of the Federalist 
Papers, 58 POL. RESEARCH Q. 329 (2005).  
 140.  HART, CONCEPT OF LAW, supra note 48, at 136. 
 141.  See supra notes 130, 135–136. 
 142.  See Hart, Positivism, supra note 48, at 612, 614–15. 
 143.  HART, CONCEPT OF LAW, supra note 48, at 252; see id. at 272–73. 
 144.  Id. at 259, 273, 274. 
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that core or standard instances dominate adjudication and, thus, that the 
penumbra—and judicial legislation—are relatively rare.145 However, he 
also identifies “such variable standards as ‘due care’” that operate like 
“non-conclusive principles which merely point to a decision but may very 
frequently fail to determine it.”146 He explicitly mentions the First, Fifth, 
and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution as 
containing examples of such standards that “function as non-conclusive 
principles.”147 As a result, it seems that Hart would expect that resolving 
unanticipated applications of “liberty” in the Fourteenth Amendment 
would require a greater degree of judicial lawmaking discretion than do 
statutes with technical and concrete terms.148 
The distance between Hart’s theory of law and that of Roberts is 
revealed most starkly when, fleshing out the underlying logic of his 
concept of law, Hart states that “preoccupation with the separation of 
powers” is itself part and parcel of the erroneous belief that judges do not 
legislate.149 He attributes the belief in the absolute separation between the 
judicial and legislative functions and the institutional theory of the 
separation of powers to Blackstone’s “childish fiction” that “judges only 
‘find,’ never ‘make’ law.”150 In short, only by ignoring or denying the 
consequences of the inherently incomplete nature of law in a variety of 
circumstances can someone take the position that it is possible for the 
judicial and legislative functions to be fundamentally separate. The 
existence of core meanings, however, will circumscribe the exercise of 
judicial lawmaking.151 The scope of the judiciary’s legislative function 
would also depend on the degree and domain of the law’s incompleteness, 
on the one hand, and the sources and methods judges are permitted to 
employ to fill the gaps thus identified, on the other. 
In sum, Roberts charges Kennedy with undermining the rule of law 
and democratic institutions by usurping the role of Congress. Hart’s legal 
theory depicts Roberts’ position as depending upon several assumptions 
that Roberts does not acknowledge or defend. Roberts portrays as neutral 
or natural his preference for a rigorous separation of powers between the 
legislature and the judiciary and for denying the existence of new 
                                                      
 145.  See id. at 128, 133, 135, 263; Hart, Positivism, supra note 48, at 615. But see Hart, 
Positivism, supra note 48, at 629; HART, CONCEPT OF LAW, supra note 48, at 204. 
 146.  HART, CONCEPT OF LAW, supra note 48, at 263. See also Hart, Positivism, supra note 48, 
at 629 (suggesting that situations where mechanical deduction is possible are rare). 
 147.  HART, CONCEPT OF LAW, supra note 48, at 261. 
 148.  See id. at 274 (attributing to judges of great stature and “a host of other lawyers” the view 
that “many cases” can be decided “either way”). 
 149.  Hart, Positivism, supra note 48, at 609–10. 
 150.  Id. at 610 (attributing the phrase “childish fiction” to John Austin). 
 151.  Id. at 629 (stating that “we live among uncertainties . . . and that existing law imposes only 
limits on our choice and not the choice itself”).  
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fundamental rights except to constitutionalize specific values supported by 
longstanding traditions.  Hart would disagree with both these claims. 
Although Hart’s hostility to judicial disregard for the text of laws and 
judges’ imposition of their personal morality in the guise of adjudication is 
as strong as that of Roberts, Hart argues that the nature of law itself 
requires judges to judge when there are gaps in the law. Most strikingly, 
Hart argues that resort by judges to history or tradition to fill the gaps is 
just as biased and driven by policy as resort to contemporary social needs. 
For Hart, then, rigorous textualism, committed positivism, and fidelity to 
law are consistent with, and indeed demand, judicial legislation when 
judges are confronted with problems occasioned by the incompleteness of 
law.  From this perspective, Roberts himself exercises judicial discretion 
when he chooses to limit judicial discretion by turning to history and 
established traditions rather than to orient himself by contemporary social 
needs. Were Roberts to evaluate the constitutionality of same-sex marriage 
in light of those needs, he might still disagree with Kennedy about the 
nature of society’s needs and the weight of the parties’ claims, as 
compared with other considerations. For example, Roberts might have 
argued that for political reasons or to reduce the likelihood of social 
disruptiveness, same-sex marriage should not be constitutionalized at that 
time. Indeed, Roberts makes such an argument in the course of his dissent, 
as part of his separation of powers analysis.152 If, however, he recognized 
his argument as one of policy rather than constitutional law, the exact 
nature of the divide between him and Kennedy would have been more 
transparent and the opposing views more clearly joined. 
These conclusions accord with analysis of the constitutional law 
differences between the two justices. Kennedy’s defense of the Obergefell 
holding, like Roberts’ dissent, was based upon principles derived from the 
Court’s own precedents, not from an abstract understanding of the 
meaning of marriage or moral principles independent of the Court’s 
constitutional jurisprudence.153 Both Justices relied upon the Court’s 
precedents and traditions: for Roberts, the standard was what the Court’s 
“precedents have repeatedly described,”154 i.e., marriage as heterosexual, 
while Kennedy relied upon what the precedents have presupposed as 
justifications for the positions the Court reached. For Roberts, the law 
contains a fixed core not subject to change. For Kennedy, the law’s core 
includes its rationales or purposes and, thus, it can evolve as the means to 
achieve those purposes undergoes change, as long as it changes in ways 
consistent with the underlying rationales. By proceeding in this fashion, 
Kennedy was following the very method employed by the Court in earlier 
                                                      
 152.  See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2624–25 (2015). 
 153.  See the discussion supra notes 96–117 and accompanying text.  
 154.  Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2614 (emphasis added). 
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cases and in the precedents they relied upon, which declared marriage a 
fundamental right implicit in the Fourteenth Amendment’s concept of 
liberty in the first place.155  
The jurisprudential culprit, if there is one, would seem to be the late 
nineteenth and twentieth-century decisions that read liberty in the 
Fourteenth Amendment to include affirmative rights and declined to find a 
fixed core meaning in the concept of liberty, leaving the meaning open, 
often explicitly, to further elaboration. For example, the Meyer decision 
declared that the Court “has not attempted to define with exactness the 
liberty thus guaranteed.”156 In Malloy v. Hogan, the Court argued further 
that it had “not hesitated to re-examine past decisions according the 
Fourteenth Amendment a less central role in the preservation of basic 
liberties than that which was contemplated by its Framers when they 
added the Amendment to our constitutional scheme.”157 In short, since the 
Court’s practice of finding evolving standards of personal freedom 
embedded in the Fourteenth Amendment’s concept of liberty is itself 
“objectively, deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition,”158 the 
burden of persuasion is, arguably, on those who would deny expanding the 
right to marry in circumstances that can reasonably be seen as involving 
“vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free 
men.”159  
 Kennedy also maintains that those who ratified the Fourteenth 
Amendment as well as the Bill of Rights “did not presume to know the 
extent of freedom in all of its dimensions, and so they entrusted to future 
generations a charter protecting the right of all persons to enjoy liberty as 
we learn its meaning.”160 Although Scalia castigates these words as 
legitimating unfettered judicial discretion,161 Roberts agrees with Kennedy 
that the Framers left the subject of domestic relations to future 
generations. For Roberts, however, the Framers intended these issues to be 
decided by the states rather than the federal government.162 The difference 
between the two Justices is thus not about the fact that the Constitution’s 
                                                      
 155.  On family law affirmative rights, see Appleton, supra note 92. 
156.  Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 399 (1923); see also Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 
(1954) (noting that “the Court has not assumed to define ‘liberty’ with any great precision,” and 
equating liberty with “the full range of conduct which the individual is free to pursue”). 
157.  378 U.S. 1, 5 (1964); see also Casey, 505 U.S. at 848 (stating that “[n]either the Bill of 
Rights nor the specific practices of States at the time of the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment 
marks the outer limits of the substantive sphere of liberty which the Fourteenth Amendment 
protects.”). 
158.  The quoted language is from Roberts’ dissent in Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2618 (Roberts, 
C.J., dissenting), although the idea expressed in the text is at odds with his dissent. 
 159.  Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399.  
160.  Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2598. 
161.  Id. at 2628 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also id. at 2624 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 162.  Id. at 2613–14 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
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protection of marriage needs “filling in” by future generations. It is about 
who decides and in light of what standards the gaps are filled. As a matter 
of constitutional law, then, both Justices rely on arguments based upon 
inferences derived from precedents, given that the literal text of the 
Constitution does not confer fundamental status on marriage at all, 
regardless of sexual orientation. They disagree about which precedents 
should be controlling and, at times, about whether state or federal law 
should decide the outcome, but not whether old rights can be superseded 
or expanded by new rights. Roberts believes that democratic majorities in 
the states should decide the meaning of marriage in the case of same-sex 
marriage. As discussed above, his view presupposes what he is trying to 
prove, namely, that the right of same-sex couples to marry is not 
fundamental.163  For, when Roberts believes a right is fundamental, he 
supports the Court overriding democratic majorities, e.g., in Loving, where 
the federal judiciary superseded democratically enacted state law 
regarding marriage164 and in Randall v. Sorrell, where the federal judiciary 
rejected state campaign finance legislation enacted to combat corruption in 
state elections.165  
In sum, the opposition between Roberts and Kennedy is significant but 
less stark than first appears. Roberts rejects Kennedy’s recourse to the 
purposes and justifications for treating marriage as a fundamental right, as 
those purposes have been elaborated in earlier Supreme Court cases. That 
is not to say that Roberts always refrains from relying on the purpose of 
constitutional provisions.166 But in Obergefell, his insistence on history 
and well-established traditions as the only sources for interpreting the 
scope of the right to marry is connected to his theory of law as limited to 
core meanings to the greatest extent possible, his belief that these are 
unchanging, and his assumption that looking backward to fill gaps in the 
law is the most effective way to protect the law’s core meanings. What the 
analysis of Hart’s legal theory clarifies, is that there are alternatives to 
history and tradition for filling in gaps in core meanings consistent with 
positivism and respect for core meanings and that Roberts has chosen to 
rely on these rather than alternatives, such as moral considerations or 
contemporary social policy normal. From this perspective, Roberts’ 
method is itself an exercise of judicial discretion based upon public policy. 
  
                                                      
163.  See supra notes 27–28 and accompanying text. 
 164.  See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2614. 
 165.  See, e.g., Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230 (2006) (invalidating state law campaign finance 
restrictions). Roberts joined the plurality opinion written by Justice Breyer. 
 166.  See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 376 (2010) (Roberts, C.J., concurring). In 
the area of statutory interpretation, Roberts frequently and explicitly consults purpose and legislative 
history. See, e.g., King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2494–96 (2015); Bond v. United States, 572 U.S. 
844, 856–58, 860–62 (2014). 
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Not only is Roberts’ argument more dependent upon policy 
considerations than his dissent acknowledges, when considered through 
the lens of Hart’s legal theory, but Kennedy’s Obergefell reasoning is not 
as open-ended as some critics fear. As is argued in Part V, Kennedy’s 
method is purposive, but in key respects it is a restrained purposivism. In 
particular, he is as wedded to the basic framework of the American 
constitutional system as Roberts, even though they pursue that 
commitment in different ways. As a consequence, the two Justices 
represent two poles on a fairly restricted continuum rather than the polar 
opposites they are thought to be. 
V. THE FULLER-KENNEDY COMPARISON 
Kennedy’s decision to view law as incorporating the reasons 
underlying legal precepts as well as the precepts themselves is also a 
choice.  Kennedy agrees with Roberts and the other dissenters that the 
fundamental rights protected by the liberty guarantee of the due process 
clause are circumscribed and must be constitutionally justified. He refers 
to them as “certain specific rights that allow persons, within a lawful 
realm, to define and express their identity.”167  Although these words seem 
vague, they closely track statements made in other Supreme Court 
decisions. For example, in Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, the Court noted its 
long history of protecting “highly personal relationships” under the liberty 
prong of the Fourteenth Amendment so as to safeguard “the ability 
independently to define one’s identity that is central to any concept of 
liberty.”168 As was discussed in Part III, Kennedy seeks to conform his 
interpretation of the scope of marriage to the standard of “within a lawful 
realm” by anchoring it to the justifications advanced in the precedents 
described above.169 
The character of Kennedy’s reasoning can be appreciated by situating 
it within a framework elaborated by political theorist Paul Kahn, who 
argues that many debates within American constitutional law are best 
understood as disagreements between two conceptual models of the 
structure of a country’s political regime. For one model, reason and 
political theory are central, alongside of consent and popular will; in the 
                                                      
167.  Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2593. 
 168.  Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618–19 (1984) (upholding a state public 
accommodations anti-discrimination law as applied to a private organization). See also Bowers v. 
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 204–205 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (noting that certain personal 
rights are constitutionally protected “not because they contribute, in some direct and material way, to 
the general public welfare, but because they form so central a part of an individual's life”); Kelly v. 
Johnson, 425 U.S. 238, 251 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (connecting liberty in the Fourteenth 
Amendment to “the values of privacy, self-identity, autonomy, and personal integrity”). 
 169.  See supra notes 96–117 and accompanying text. 
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other model, consent and popular will are central, with reason and political 
theory playing at most a subordinate role.170 According to the former 
model, a country’s constitutional design may incorporate the findings of 
political science, experience, logic, and reason, both at the regime’s 
inception or later, in response to problems that have arisen or 
circumstances that have changed over time.171 In contrast, the popular will 
or consent model considers an existing form of government as fixed once 
it is popularly adopted because of its origin in the consent of the governed. 
As a consequence, the form of government established at the founding of a 
constitutional order is viewed as both “self-contained and self-sustaining,” 
that is, any legal developments that occur over time must maintain the 
original character or structure of the political order initially established and 
agreed to.172 This is possible if all developments “incorporate growth . . . 
but not change in the defining form.”173  Structural change in constitutional 
design, however, is permissible only through popular procedures that were 
themselves popularly approved. 
Using the prism of the two models, constitutional decisions can be 
distinguished based upon whether or to what extent they draw on sources 
internal or external to the foundational design of the U.S. constitutional 
system. Internal sources would include all enacted laws, promulgated 
regulations, executive decrees, judicial decisions, and other guidance or 
rulings of institutions because and to the extent that they have been 
granted lawmaking authority by canonical legal texts, constitutional or 
otherwise. External sources, in contrast, would include natural law 
precepts, international law, the laws of other countries, social policy, 
political theory, moral theory, or some other theoretical enterprise, since 
these provide understandings that cannot be derived organically from 
canonical texts. Because the fundamental law of the United States contains 
                                                      
 170.  See Paul W. Kahn, Reason and Will in the Origins of American Constitutionalism, 98 
YALE L.J. 449, 450–51, 452, 454–58 (1989). He calls the model based upon reason and political 
science as well as popular will the “technical model,” and the one based primarily or exclusively upon 
popular will the “organic model.” Id. at 450. Kahn argues that the former model was embraced by the 
founding fathers. See id. at 453–58. Because of the political and social attitudes at the time, the 
founders considered popular will and consent as critical for legitimating political authority based upon 
reason or political science. See id. at 450 (noting the twin foundational elements of reason and will). 
See id. at 458 (describing “the task of The Federalist [Papers]” as seeking “a convergence of reason 
and will, of political science and political legitimacy”). One piece of evidence that Kahn cites is the 
first page of FEDERALIST PAPERS No. 1, which asks “whether societies of men are really capable or 
not of establishing good government from reflection and choice, or whether they are forever destined 
to depend for their political constitutions on accident and force.” Id. at 454. Kahn also argues that 
during the first half of the nineteenth century, the Justices on the Supreme Court gradually came to 
assume the model in which popular will dominates. See id. at 450, 490, 494. 
 171.  See Kahn, Reason and Will, supra note 170, at 450, 455–58. 
 172.  Id. at 450–51. 
 173.  See id. at 451, 452, n.6.  At one point, Kahn states that some change is possible, “as long as 
that change is itself rooted in the history of the specific community,” but he does not elaborate. Id. at 
451, n.9. 
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general or abstract terms as well as concrete or particularized ones, how 
the former are interpreted will depend in large part upon the internal or 
external approach employed by the interpreter. Of course, in practice, legal 
systems are not simple, and the laws of many nations rely on a mixture of 
external and internal sources of law. 
Supreme Court decisions have at times relied on precepts that are very 
general and not tied to the U.S. constitutional scheme. Some of these 
decisions also rely on traditional sources, i.e., explicit precedents and other 
materials internal to the legal structure as it has developed. For example, 
as noted earlier, in Jaycees, the Court sought to explicate two types of 
constitutionally protected association, intimate and expressive, even 
though freedom of association as such is not mentioned in the 
Constitution. The Court identified freedom of intimate association as 
protected by the Constitution because its existence is necessary “to define 
one’s identity that is central to any concept of liberty.”174  “Any concept of 
liberty” is not a norm internal to the American constitutional scheme; had 
Publius written the decision in Jaycees at the time of the founding, it 
would have been obvious that he was relying on a general moral or 
political concept. Similarly, in his dissent in the Slaughter-House Cases, 
Justice Bradley proclaimed that the “rights of life, liberty, and property . . . 
are the fundamental rights which, I contend, belong to citizens of every 
free government.”175 Like Marshall’s opinions, Bradley’s statement rests 
upon an understanding of citizenship in free governments as an abstract 
concept rather than resting upon the specific character of the American 
form of free government.  
The reasoning by Chief Justice Marshall also affords numerous 
examples of looking to external sources to justify the substance of his 
holdings. In Marbury, for example, Marshall derives the power of the 
Supreme Court to invalidate laws enacted by Congress by arguing that, 
when a people has “an original right to establish, for their future 
government, such principles as, in their opinion, shall most conduce to 
their own happiness” and establishes a written constitution, it follows 
logically that the constitution must have priority over statutory law, or the 
result would be “absurd.”176 Marshall’s argument is theoretical: given a 
constitutional scheme of a certain kind, certain consequences follow 
logically. Therefore, those consequences must be attributed to particular 
nations, like the United States, that have adopted a constitutional scheme 
                                                      
 174.  Jaycees, 468 U.S. at 619. 
 175.  83 U.S. 36, 116 (1872) (Bradley, J., dissenting) (interpreting the content of the privileges 
and immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 176.  Kahn, Reason and Will, supra note 170, at 481 (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 
176–77 (1803)). Kahn characterizes this as an argument from first principles. Id. 
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of that kind. For Marshall, logic also dictates that, given the nature of the 
judicial function, it is the role of courts to enforce the supremacy of 
constitutional precepts over other types of law since resolving conflicts 
between constitutional law and ordinary legislation “is of the very essence 
of judicial duty.”177 As Kahn notes, the judicial function that Marshall 
references is an abstract concept since the U.S. Constitution does not 
describe the judicial power that it authorizes.178 Marshall’s subsequent 
statement, that the text of the United States Constitution “furnish[es] 
additional arguments” in support of judicial review, reinforces Kahn’s 
thesis.179 Kahn describes a similar pattern of theoretical reasoning 
followed by textual confirmation in McCulloch v. Maryland.180 These 
decisions of Chief Justice Marshall thus combine reasoning based upon 
both external and internal sources to establish fundamental precepts 
governing the role of the judiciary in the United States. 
The Court also has had recourse at times to some kind of universal 
standard independent of American law in fundamental rights cases, 
especially, although not exclusively, in the area of criminal law. These 
include “notions of justice of English speaking people,”181 what is 
“implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,”182 a right “older than the Bill 
of Rights, older than our political parties, older than our school system,”183 
and “one of the basic civil rights of man.”184  
Frequently the Supreme Court’s reasoning is grounded less abstractly, 
but at a very high level of generality. For example, in Meyer, the Court 
attempted to elucidate the meaning of liberty in the Fourteenth 
Amendment by listing specific rights as well as “generally those privileges 
long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of 
happiness by free men.”185 The common law referred to may be precedents 
of American courts, although the Court does not so limit it. Even if the 
reference is understood to mean the precedents of American courts, the 
standard is extremely indeterminate by virtue of depending upon what 
constitutes happiness in the eyes of free men, as a court understands those 
terms. Similarly, in Griswold v. Connecticut, Justice Goldberg asserted 
that the right of privacy is a fundamental personal right, emanating “from 
                                                      
 177.  Id. at 481–82 (quoting Marbury, 5 U.S. at 177, 178). 
 178.  Id. at 481. 
 179.  Id. at 483 (quoting Marbury, 5 U.S. at 178). 
 180.  17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819), discussed in Kahn, Reason and Will, supra note 170, at 
483–86. 
 181.  Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 169 (1952) (quoting Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 
401, 417 (1945)). 
 182.  Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937), overruled by Benton v. Maryland, 395 
U.S. 784 (1969). 
 183.  Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965) (referring to the right of privacy). 
 184.  Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967). 
 185.  Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol11/iss2/6
 
 
 
 
 
 
2019]                        POLARIZATION AT THE SUPREME COURT?                                    
 
 
 
289
the totality of the constitutional scheme under which we live.”186 So 
understood, the right to privacy is arguably a value internal to the 
American legal system, although not anchored to any specific provision of 
the system. In Duncan v Louisiana, the Court first based its conclusion 
about incorporating the Fifth and Sixth Amendments into the Fourteenth 
Amendment on “those fundamental principles of liberty and justice which 
lie at the base of all our civil and political institutions”187 and whether the 
right asserted was “basic in our system of jurisprudence.”188 Both 
references were associated with the United States legal system, and both 
relied on the system’s underlying principles or justifications. The Duncan 
Court’s basis for its holding was thus arguably internal to the American 
constitutional order without relying exclusively on the text of the 
Constitution or judicial precedents. At the same time, the Duncan Court 
also based its decision on whether the right claimed by the plaintiff was “a 
fundamental right, essential to a fair trial.” To the extent that the idea of a 
fair trial referred to is independent of the American scheme of 
government, Duncan also relied upon principles external to the 
specifically American constitutional framework. It is possible, however, 
that the idea of a fair trial referred to was assumed to be a fair trial under 
the American Constitution, in which case it would be internal to the 
system, although at a high level of generality. Other examples of 
extremely general standards relied upon by the Court that are connected to 
the American constitutional system as a whole are “the American scheme 
of justice”189 and “the principles upon which our Nation was built.”190 
In other decisions, the Court proceeds more narrowly, finding 
protected rights implicit in specific textual provisions, often the Bill of 
Rights. Famously, in Griswold, for example, the majority opinion derived 
the right of privacy at stake from the penumbra of several of the 
constitutional amendments that make up the Bill of Rights.191 The opinion 
also characterized the right as “older than the Bill of Rights—older than 
our political parties, older than our school system.”192 The Griswold Court 
thus relied upon principles both internal and external to the legal system. 
In Jaycees, the Court found freedom of expressive association to be 
implicit in the First Amendment guarantees of freedom of speech and 
                                                      
 186.  Griswold, 381 U.S. at 494 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (quoting Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 
497, 521 (1961)). 
 187.  391 U.S. 145, 148 (1968) (citing Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 67 (1932)). Powell cited 
Herbert v. Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312, 316 (1926), for this proposition. 
 188.  Duncan, 391 U.S. at 148–49 (citing In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 273 (1948)). 
 189.  Id. at 149. 
 190.  Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2631 (2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 191.  Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485. 
 192.  Id. at 486. 
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assembly because the two explicit guarantees “could not be vigorously 
protected from interference by the State unless a correlative freedom to 
engage in group effort toward those ends were not also guaranteed.”193 
In short, the Court has justified its expansions of existing rights on a 
wide assortment of grounds, including abstract principles of justice, 
liberty, happiness, or the civil rights of man. It has also justified its 
decisions based upon principles arguably implicit in the American 
constitutional design taken as a whole or inherent in its civil or political 
institutions. Kennedy’s due process argument in Obergefell resorts neither 
to notions external to and independent of the U.S. legal system nor to 
concepts arguably grounded in the regime, but extremely abstract or at a 
high level of generality. Rather, he limits himself to the purposes and 
principles connected to a specific liberty interest–marriage–and in each 
instance, he draws on the explicit statements of earlier Courts in 
explicating that interest’s importance. From this vantage point, Kennedy’s 
purposivism is restrained and his reasoning satisfies one of the basic 
requirements of a legal system that develops by “incorporat[ing] 
growth . . . but not change in the defining form.”194 This is the hallmark of 
judging that respects the primacy of government deriving its legitimacy 
from the consent of the governed, because it reasons within the 
constitutional framework initially ratified by the public and developed by 
subsequent decisions that resolve disputes without resort to principles 
external to that framework.   
CONCLUSION 
Understandably, the majority opinion in Obergefell contributed to the 
perception that Supreme Court decisions, especially decisions endorsed by 
only five of the nine justices, reflect the polarization that America has 
increasingly witnessed in recent decades. Although same-sex marriage 
was legal in thirty-eight states and Washington, DC, when the decision 
was handed down, only eleven states and Washington, DC, authorized 
same-sex marriage by legislation or referendum,195 and many states had 
banned same-sex marriage.196 Although a majority of individuals polled 
                                                      
 193.  Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 622 (1984). See also Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 
457 U.S. 853, 866 (1982) (holding the school board’s removal of certain books from the school library 
violated “the spirit of the First Amendment”). 
 194.  See supra note 173 and accompanying text. 
 195.  Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2615 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). Roberts’ dissent claims that the 
courts of an additional five states had ruled that same-sex marriage was a right under the state’s 
constitution. Id. However, other sources state that the courts in twenty-six states had ruled that same-
sex marriage was legal. See Same-Sex Marriage Laws, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES 
(NCSL) (June 26, 2015), http://www.ncsl.org/research/human-services/same-sex-marriage-
laws.aspx#1. 
 196.  By 2010, twenty-five states had banned same-sex marriage, but many of these bans were 
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favored legalizing same-sex marriage at that time, there were large 
differences in the percentages of those who favored or rejected same-sex 
marriage based upon such things as age and religious or political party 
affiliation.197 These differences help explain why the decision was so 
controversial among certain groups.    
The decision was also controversial within the legal community, 
where the lines were drawn more on institutional grounds than on the 
merits of the substantive issue decided. This essay has attempted to 
address the legal controversy by arguing that the prism of constitutional 
law, as presented by traditional constitutional scholarship, exaggerates the 
differences between the majority and the dissenters. In particular, the 
analysis offers a different perspective on the charges made by the 
dissenters that Kennedy’s opinion was an instance of reprehensible 
judicial activism and an egregious violation of the separation of powers. 
Using the legal theories of H. L. A. Hart and Lon Fuller, as well as the 
work of Paul Kahn, I have argued that Kennedy took seriously the 
obligation to ground the majority’s decision in precedent and tradition, 
even as he clearly expanded those precedents and traditions when he 
applied existing doctrine to same-sex marriage. I have also argued that, 
from those theoretical perspectives, Roberts’s reasoning relies on some 
constitutional doctrines that may themselves be seen as products of public 
policy and that the structure of his dissent masks the conclusory nature of 
his assertion that the most basic issues in Obergefell are the separation of 
powers and the role of courts in a democracy. Although these reflections 
are unlikely to change anyone’s opinions about the correctness of the 
decision,198 hopefully they provide a more moderate, and possibly 
moderating, perspective from which to judge the protagonists and to frame 
future discussions about the legitimacy of evolving notions of human 
rights. 
                                                                                                                           
overturned in the years preceding the Obergefell decision. See State-by-State History of Banning and 
Legalizing Gay Marriage, 1994 to 2015, PROCON.ORG (Feb. 16, 2016), http://gaymarriage.procon.org/
view.resource.php?resourceID=004857. 
 197.    See Changing Attitudes on Gay Marriage, PEW RESEARCH CENTER, http://www.pewforu
m.org/2016/05/12/changing-attitudes-on-gay-marriage/. 
198.  See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 555 (2012) (dismissing the 
view of economists that equate the effects of activity and inactivity on the grounds that the Framers 
“were ‘practical statesmen,’ not metaphysical philosophers”). 
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